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Abstract
Normative studies misunderstand a crucial aspect of cannabis legalization: they
have not critically analyzed how the pharmaceutical industry might react when synthetic
cannabinoid compounds could be incorporated into new products. I argue that when
marijuana is federally legal, there will be two independent market developments in: i) the
cannabis market, which includes botanic cannabis and herbal supplements sold in retail
nutrition stores; and ii) the FDA-approved ethical drug market. How does the drug
industry’s monopolistic pricing structure lend itself to strategic pricing for these new
synthetic cannabinoids? How much competition can we expect between dispensaries and
nutrition shops selling herbal supplements? This work seeks to answer these questions by
reviewing the literature on pricing and marketing strategies. I find that supplements’
pricing strategies are based on production costs and retail shops’ degree of market power.
Prices for over-the-counter herbal supplements will follow a medium-low price to low
price skimming trajectory. From a policy perspective, health insurers may cover these
drugs in future drug plans. Synthetic cannabinoids may also be a breakthrough in the
battling the opioid epidemic.
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Chapter I: A Tale of Two Markets
Marijuana has been called many things: weed, pot, reefer, grass, and for some,
medicine. It has been used as an herbal remedy dating back to ancient China. In the 20th
century United States, was seen as a dangerous psychoactive drug deserving of strict
prohibition. Some argue that the costs of carcinogenic smoke and toxic gases outweigh its
therapeutic benefits. Studies support the medical effects, but they are not unanimous.
In recent decades, federal cannabis legalization has slowly gained momentum
Marijuana has been on a strange trip from toleration, to abandonment, marginalization,
acceptance, and soon, capitalization. The timeline below shows the progression in the
liberalization of marijuana. In recent years, public interest in marijuana has hit an alltime-high. In the most recent Pew Research poll, 57% of Americans believe marijuana
should be legal; 71% of Millennials, 57% of Generation X and 56% of the Baby Boomer
Generation support of legalization (Pew Research Center 2016). Public interest is putting
pressure on the U.S. Government to make efforts to legalize or decriminalize cannabis.
The following timeline marks the milestones in federal marijuana liberalization policy:
1970: The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 makes marijuana a Schedule I drug,
declaring it as dangerous as peyote (mescaline), Ecstasy (MDMA), or heroin.
Legally, it holds no medical purpose and is more addictive and less
therapeutically useful than cocaine and other opioids.
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2001: The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) rules that there is no
distinction between recreational and medical marijuana under California’s
Compassionate Use Act. The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 precludes the
use of cannabis as a medical defense. However, the SCOTUS also determines that
states are entitled to medical marijuana programs insofar as it pertains to their
10th Constitutional Amendment Right. SCOTUS determines that California may
serve as a “social laboratory” for future marijuana laws. (United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative).
2003: The U.S. Patent Office grants a patent on marijuana to the U.S. Department
of Health and Huma Services to suggest it may be useful in treating Alzheimer’s.
(U.S. 6,630,507: 2003) It was the U.S. government’s first recognition since 1937
that cannabis may have a medical use.
2009: The Department of Justice (DOJ) sends a memo to Attorney Generals
across the country, recommending that they not prosecute medical marijuana
patients who were in ‘clear and unambiguous’ compliance with state law
(Campbell 2012: 34).
2013: The DOJ releases another memorandum. This one is similar to the 2009
memo, but its focus is on preventing the growth of illegitimate commercial
enterprises and the exacerbation of public health issues associated with states’
cannabis laws. (Cole 2013).
2014: A New Mexico court rules that workmen's compensation must pay for a
person’s medical cannabis if that person is a valid participant in the state’s
2

medical cannabis program. Citing the 2013 DOJ memo, the presiding appellate
judge ruled that the reimbursement of medical cannabis does not violate federal
public policy (Vialpando v. Ben’s Automotive Services and Redwood Fire &
Casualty).
2015: Two separate bills are introduced into the U.S. House of Representatives,
which would federally legalize marijuana, remove it as a Schedule I drug, tax and
regulate it. It would not, however, require states to legalize it if they chose not to
(Ferner 2015). As the time of this writing, the bill is stalled.
2016: The Supreme Court denies hearing a lawsuit case against Colorado. The
plaintiffs in Nebraska and Oklahoma v. Colorado argued that Colorado’s
legalized marijuana market put a strain on their states’ criminal justice resources.
Legal experts postulate that the Court denied hearing the case since they had
previously ruled on Congress’ authority to regulate cannabis in interstate
commerce.
2016: The DEA decides that it will not reschedule cannabis from its current
Schedule I status, but it will increase access to the plant for scientific research
purposes—not for commercial development (Department of Justice 2016).
It is quite possible that we could see marijuana legalized within our lifetime. A
majority of Americans believe that marijuana should be outright legalized to allow for
federal taxation and regulation. Many economic studies argue for this level of
legalization, but it is not clear what happens after the fact. These milestones reflect that
the marijuana liberalization debate is focused pushing botanic cannabis into the formal
3

health care system. However, most insurance companies are strongly opposed to covering
patients’ dispensary purchases, regardless of whether marijuana is federally legal or not.
There is precedent for it, but it is rare (Hermes in Vande Panne 2013).
When legalized, how might drug companies react? So far the conversation about
legalizing cannabis has largely ignored their incentives to lobby against marijuana—and
the incentives they have in developing their own synthetic cannabinoid drugs. From my
perspective, we have been talking about why marijuana should be legalized, but neglect
to see why it will not (yet): U.S. drug companies must have a clinical alternative to offer
patients in the market for pharmaceuticals in order to ensure that they remain loyal
customers. Otherwise, patients may leave the drug market when cannabis is more
accessible, and drug companies would lose profits.
Furthermore, what kinds of new drug products might they create, and what will
pricing structures look like? In this work, I address this perspective. Specifically, how
might Big Pharma react if forthcoming marijuana research results in synthetic
cannabinoid compounds that are available to create new products? Beyond that, how does
the pharmaceutical industry’s pricing structure lend itself to strategic pricing for new
synthetic cannabinoids? Marijuana legalization would not resolve advocates’ fight to
make the Cannabis Sativa L. plant and all of its derivatives (oil, hemp, etc.) FDAapproved medicine. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) does not approve plant
material as methods of dispensing in prescription drugs (Sabet 2012).
Advocates argue that Big Pharma lobbies against legalization because if cannabis
could treat a range of ailments like seizures, PTSD, cancer, etc., then the drug industry
4

would lose large sums of profits. This is true insofar as the industry is not yet ready to
enter into the cannabis industry. We assume here that the research that would result from
the Drug Enforcement Agency’s (DEA) decision to reschedule marijuana might
eventually result in new, better cannabinoid drugs. Big Pharma is lobbying against pot’s
legalization until it has enough research to get better, more effective drugs in the
pipeline—ones that could be a safer alternative to highly scrutinized opioid medications.
It is highly unlikely that the federal U.S. government will move toward a fullscale legalization of the cash crop. I suspect that legalization might unfold incrementally
in order to allow drug companies time to develop successfully new drug offerings.
Specifically, legalization should first include legislation to make an exception to
cannabis’s possession for scientific research. If profitable, drug companies would no
longer have an incentive to lobby against marijuana. This would allow drug development
without making supplements and cannabis legal. After that, legalization for medical use
would be possible, followed by taxation and regulation of adult recreational cannabis.
If marijuana were to become legal in this context, drug companies would have
created synthetic marijuana products to market in the FDA-approved ethical drug market.
This is the market in which behind the counter or “legend” drugs and their generic
equivalents are sold. These would include synthesized therapeutic versions of those found
in the cannabis plant; of these, the most sought-after will be cannabidiol (CBD, the
healing component). Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC, the psychoactive component) may also
be of interest, but the point is that companies will want to isolate these compounds,
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producing lab-manufactured synthetics to make them unique and distinct from any
generic oil supplement or botanic strain.
Scientists might uncover as-of-now unknown compounds. They could create a
more complete profile of marijuana’s chemical structure and understand more fully the
interaction(s) of those chemicals.
It is postulated that the beneficial therapeutic effects of cannabis result from the
interaction of different cannabinoids and other compounds present in the plant
Cannabis sativa L. This may explain why cannabis-based medicines made from
whole plant extracts may be more effective than single cannabinoid products [like
Marinol or Syndros] (Stott 2004: 85).
This work begins with this hypothesis: if marijuana were legalized for scientific research
purposes, drug companies would be able to develop these new and improved cannabinoid
drugs. The question is, Assuming that these products are scientifically possible, what
might pricing strategies look like?
The purpose of this work is an attempt to analyze qualitatively market
developments in the cross-section of the pharmaceutical and legal marijuana industries.
By defining the market boundaries, we can determine launch prices for new synthetic
cannabinoid pharmaceuticals and OTC herbal supplements. Other important factors are
the demand determinants for the products in these markets (income, preferences, etc.).
Therefore, this paper focuses on the supply side of bringing drugs to market.
In the real world, how drug companies might organize themselves in terms of
pricing decisions and market power depends on working relationships with insurers and
other drug companies. Prices are not created in a vacuum; they depend on the industrial
environment, including: competing firms and their products, cross-elasticity of demand
6

and supply, development and promotional costs, patent positioning (and laws regarding
such), market power, technical capacity and abilities, and many more (Weston in Chien
1979: 75) These factors create the environment and determine how these companies will
operate. This is known as the structure-conduct-performance model that encompasses
modern industrial economic theory. Please note that the drug company-drug insurer
dynamic presents some out-of-scope considerations. However, I will comment on it in
my concluding remarks.
The Market Segmentation Model
Companies act as competing monopolists, as described in Chapter III. They
attempt to segment the market into brand loyal customers to gain market share.
Advertising attempts to ensure that a customer will not buy the competitor’s product.
This keeps the different customers that firms sell to independent, limiting the opportunity
for “arbitrage” in different markets. It determines monopolists’ level of second-degree
price discrimination. Drug companies do not launch a single price for the industry, but
many: high prices for patients with higher levels of willingness-to-pay, and low prices or
free to low-income patients receiving public health care, i.e. Medicaid. “Payers that use
economic considerations may receive low prices if this is required in order to
demonstrate economic attractiveness. Thus, pharmaceutical manufacturers may be
required to set several different prices” (Zaric 2008: 1278). Normally in this seconddegree price discrimination, producers will offer different sets of customers a lower price
for greater quantities purchased. Firms initially have no method to discern which
customers have a low willingness to pay, and which have a higher one. They resolve this,
7

Varian (1996) says, by changing the quality of the product. Those with a lower
willingness to pay, or “low demand”, will self-select themselves to choose the product
with a lower quality at a lower price. The same is true for the high demand customer. “If
the producer cannot precisely identify the users, it may want to adjust the characteristics
of the good being sold so that users self-select the product targeted for them (Varian 5:
1996, italics in original).” Likewise, in the market for brand-name and generic drugs,
Many studies trace price rigidity of patent-expired drugs to consumers’ price
insensitivity toward brand-name drugs. When a market is segmented between the
price-sensitive consumers who adopt the generic and the price-insensitive
consumers who continue to use the brand-name drug, the brand-name drug firm
can raise its price optimally to its captive or price-insensitive clients and simply
ignore the price-sensitive business siphoned off by its generic competitors (Hong
et al 2005: 747).
There could be at least three versions of cannabis-based products in the product
space. Drug companies are then able to isolate the customers willing to pay for
convenience and better quality of care. Customers self-select themselves into either the
ethical drug market or into the market for cannabis, depending on the price that they are
willing to pay for an improved quality of cannabis that they wish to consume. As the
quality of these products decreases, so too does the price. These potential products are:
1.

FDA-approved prescription cannabinoid drugs

2.

Botanic cannabis (phytocannabinoids)

3.

Generic over-the-counter (OTC) cannabis health supplements

Following from this, we could expect to see two distinct market developments within the
cannabis industry. In one market, patients purchase FDA-approved drugs. In the other,
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patients with a ‘preference’ for natural medicine purchase health care through home
remedies, dietary supplements and naturopathic medicines, including botanic cannabis.
To be clear, I argue that people will choose one of three products to consume, and
products are differentiated with respect to quality. In fact, it is actually a determinant of
product choice. A preference for higher quality, matched with a willingness to pay for it,
would place the customer into one of three markets for these products.
Although product with respect to quality is itself a form of product differentiation,
the two can be discussed separately. A quality differentiation is a product decision based
on a preference for a higher grade or standard of excellence among products. This is
typically reflected in each product’s price. Between ethical drugs and OTC health
supplements, the former has a stricter regulatory process to ensure more quality control
than a health supplement. In Chapter IV, I compare and contrast the two in further detail.
On the other hand, product differentiation is a product decision based on the
characteristics among competing goods. One prescription drug may come in a liquid form
while another is encapsulated. One drug may be more effective in alleviating head trauma
while the other is intended to treat nerve pain, or each may come with different side
effects. Varying product characteristics, and patients’ preferences for them, are factors
that create brand-loyalty in competing drug products; price competition plays a minor
role in this product decision (Frank & Salkever 1992). In our model, when discussing
pharmaceuticals in Chapter III, we are really talking about product differentiation. When
discussing supplements in Chapter IV, quality differentiation should be kept in mind.
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Below, I define the border between these two markets. This will allow us to
review the pricing decisions of pharmaceuticals separately from that of herbal
supplements. Herbal supplements and cannabis offer an alternative to ethical drugs;
cannabinoids themselves compete with opioids, for example. The two markets do not
compete directly, but instead customers self-select themselves into either market,
depending on their preferences and ability to pay for higher quality medicine. We further
assume that patients are aware of the level of quality they are receiving based on how
much they are willing and able to pay for it.
Figure 1 below depicts this product space. There are two large sectors in the
marijuana industry. On one side is the ethical drug industry. In particular, it would
include marijuana pharmaceuticals: both cannabis-based and -derived drugs, marketed as
an alternative competing drug products. The other industry is divided between nutrition
shops and apothecaries selling ‘generic’ herbal supplements one the one side, and
dispensaries ‘specializing’ in botanic cannabis in the other submarket. Patients may see
cannabis and generic supplements with some degree of substitution. Therefore, while the
division between the market for ethical drugs and that of the cannabis is ‘sealed off’, the
same may not be true for the division between the cannabis and dietary supplements
submarkets. This explains why the border between these two is open. As Stigler explains:
An industry should embrace the maximum geographical area and the maximum
variety of productive activities in which there is a strong long-run substitution. If
buyers can shift on a large scale from product or area B to A, then the two should
be combined. If producers can shift on a large scale from B to A, again they
should be combined…into a single industry (Stigler 1955: 152).
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Herbal
supplements:
Nutrition
shops,
apothecaries,
retail outlets

Cannabis:
Dispensaries,
retail stores
black market
sales

FDA-approved,
marijuana-derived
pharmaceuticals: Inpatient medications,
outpatient
prescriptions

For example, consider the story of Marinol (dronabinol). The drug is used
primarily in chemotherapy patients to treat nausea and vomiting. It is composed of
approximately 99% tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), one of the core healing compounds in
traditional marijuana, and sesame seed oil. Marinol is made using a process to isolate and
chemically rebuild the THC compound. It received its patent in 1986, but not before the
DEA had to reschedule synthetic THC—not marijuana proper—to a Schedule III, making
it legal for medical purposes and further research.
The drug, however, was not widely accepted, even after its indications (the onlabel intended uses for a drug) were expanded to include appetite stimulation in AIDS
patients (Stott 2004: 87), resulting in a new drug, Syndros. One reason for this is that
patients found it to be far less effective than smoked cannabis. Patients preferred cannabis
since Marinol inadequately addressed their medical needs. Its quality standards were
11

inferior to cannabis. Customers then moved through the product space, and settled in
cannabis submarket, where they remained. At the time, had drug companies patented a
substitute cannabinoid similar enough to cannabis and better than Marinol’s recipe,
patients would have remained in the ethical drug market. Patients will leave this market if
there continues to be a lack of alternatives available in it.
A preference for a certain quality and the ability to pay for it also tells us why a
patient would choose to take a prescription cannabinoid when botanic cannabis is
available. As Varian (1996) concludes, customers may pay a higher price to avoid an
inconvenience, or to reduce the restrictions on the use of their product. Examples include:
paying extra to use the express lane on the highway, paying a penalty for the freedom to
break an apartment lease before it expires, or paying for priority seating on an airline (as
in Varian (1996)). We can see that in these new drug developments, where patients face a
cash purchase of either cannabis or cannabinoids, the latter is targeted at patients who
appreciate the quality, accessibility, and convenience of using cannabis where it is
otherwise prohibited in its botanic form. Most states that have legalized or decriminalized
marijuana have also banned smoking in public. The convenience of a controlled
medicinal substance would be a benefit—as is avoiding the inconvenience of a penalty
for smoking in a prohibited area. The same is true in states that choose not to legalize or
decriminalize cannabis entirely.
Naturally, one target market for these synthetics could be hospitals and inpatient
care—where smoking/inhalation is prohibited, and an injection or an intravenous solution
is more effective. For example, Marinol and Syndros is used for nausea and vomiting
12

resulting from chemotherapy. Specialized cannabinoids might even provide a safer
alternative to chemotherapy! Similarly, for out-patient care, consider patients who are
against cannabis for ethical reasons and cannot or will not smoke it. A pharmaceutical
pill, spray, or other mode would be regarded as more legitimate if a physician prescribes
it to them. It also would allow a person to take their medication in public.
This highlights a second reason: there may be people who need to take a
pharmaceutical cannabinoid for employment reasons. Consider an employee who must
take cannabis in their health regimen, even at the risk of losing their job. If this employee
instead had an FDA-approved drug, they would pass a drug screening with a doctor’s
prescription and keep their job. This is no different from any other prescription.
Third, cannabinoids’ ability to isolate the healing compounds in cannabis, CBD
and THC, means that other minor chemicals are not present. A person can avoid the
carcinogens from smoking. An ethical drug is more sterile, thereby providing a more
valuable health product. Drug makers could potentially provide a more efficient product,
without side effects associated with other treatments, like a low risk of addiction. This
proved to be an effective selling point for OxyContin even if it was blatantly false.
Cannabinoids vs. Opioids
It is a sufficient assumption that if marijuana were rescheduled to a Schedule II,
drug companies would work to bring these synthetic marijuana products to market. If this
policy change were a necessary condition, then opioids would not be on the market.
Opioids are derived from the opium plant, the origin of another Schedule I drug: heroin.
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So the question is, if heroin was a limited impediment for opioid drug development, why
should we expect that it is a strict impediment for cannabinoids?
The divergence in outcomes between the two depends in part on its history and
stigmas associated with each. In short, opioids already had a legitimate accepted medical
use long before heroin was outlawed. Morphine (1804), codeine (1832), heroin (1874),
and hydrocodone (1920) had all been synthesized before the Controlled Substances Act
of 1970 (Narconon.org 2017). Morphine especially had already proven useful in wartime
as an effective painkiller. The 1924 Opium Prohibition Act made the importation,
manufacture, and/or possession of heroin and opium illegal, but the Act made an
exception for medical use (Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, 1922; Opium
Prohibition Importation Act, 1924). The availability of these compounds would facilitate
R&D to make stronger painkillers like Percocet (oxycodone) and Vicodin (hydrocodone
and acetaminophen). Consequently, the opium plant from which these drugs are derived
is available as Schedule II drug.
Conversely, the Marihuana Tax Act (1937) placed a tax on the commercial sale of
cannabis, including medical use. THC was not synthesized until 1964. Unlike heroin, it
would be another 20 years before it was offered in a pharmaceutical product—and an
impossible 6 year time window to get it to market before marijuana became federally
illegal; The 1970 Controlled Substances Act effectively made the 1937 Act null and void.
Only synthetic THC is available for developing cannabinoids, and its botanical origin is
restricted in the United States. In the United Kingdom, it is available for scientific
research. This left American pot at a significant disadvantage to produce research and
14

future pharmaceutical products. Permission to research cannabis in the U.K. would
eventually give British drug companies to develop better synthetic cannabinoids
(discussed below). Therefore, increasing access to cannabis, through legalization that
makes an exception for medical research or other means, is long overdue.
Outline
The thesis is summarized as follows. Chapter II describes the motivations for
pharmaceutical companies to develop a synthetic cannabinoid. What are the market
incentives, and how do the medical facts on marijuana translate into a marketable
product? Chapter II also provides supporting evidence for the economic rationale of
segmentation of consumer preferences illustrated in Figure 1. The information about
marijuana in general provided in this chapter will be useful for understanding conclusions
reached in the following ones. Chapter III serves a critical and dual purpose: it provides a
thorough review of the literature on pricing strategies within the competitive monopoly
framework. By drawing on some core features of these strategies, and combining this
information with marijuana drug development, we can speculate on launch prices and
trends for new cannabinoids. Chapter IV follows a similar procedure to describe the
marketing strategies for marijuana herbal supplements and resulting prices. Finally,
Chapter V summarizes and concludes. It offers insights into policy implications, namely,
the potential for health insurance companies to cover these drugs in their health plans;
pressures on drug companies to support marijuana legalization; and the opportunity for
synthetic cannabinoids to be a response to the opioid epidemic.
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Chapter II: Marijuana in the Marketplace
Until now, we have looked at the theoretical foundations for the present study.
The last chapter provided some justifications for dividing the cannabis market. This
chapter offers some concrete examples of types of products that might be offered, and
how they might be marketed. It will also describe Big Pharma’s incentives to create these
drugs. If scientists and pharmacists could find a way to harness the healing powers of
cannabis in a way that conforms to modern medical practices, they could effectively
create an entire new product line to treat a myriad of health problems.
A drug’s potential a ‘blockbuster’ relies on claims about its efficacy, advantage
over other drugs, the diseases it can treat, and any unique properties about the new
chemical under development. In an economic sense, firms essentially have the
opportunity to claim a competitive advantage:
[f]or a pharmaceutical to be a commercial success, it must be well protected in
terms of Intellectual Property Rights…there must be a clinical need for the
product. It has been demonstrated that [for] certain
diseases/conditions…cannabinoids provide additional relief to patients where all
existing products currently available have failed (Stott 2004: 85, italics added).
The goal for drug companies is to reproduce the effects of cannabis in a synthetic form,
package it, patent it, and market it. If a company claims that its product’s therapeutic
benefits surpass any other on the market, this marketing strategy may lead to a higher
price it higher above its competitors, yielding a significant return on its investment (Lu &
Commanor 1998). There is much more to be said on pricing strategies; the next chapter
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serves as an in depth review of these practices. Next, I will outline the possibilities for
synthetic cannabis, in the event that it is offered as a pharmaceutical product. This
includes current offerings and R&D for products in the ‘drug pipeline’, and room for
improvement in future drugs. I will also put this into context by contrasting it with
heroin-based opioids.
Synthetic Cannabinoids
Before we can look at how drug companies might react, we must answer why they
would want to invest in synthetic marijuana-derived drugs. To name a few incentives:
(the exclusion of) competition and capturing market share, gaining new patents and
extending old ones, innovation to keep a competitive advantage, and rising shareholder
value, which funds financial capital for continuing R&D.
These motivations would eventually lead them to produce a drug that includes
minor chemicals in addition to THC and CBD, not just those isolated chemicals. Drug
companies could patent a product or process that improves upon Marinol or Syndros
(whose developments also led to the invention of another antiemetic, Cesamet
(nabilone)). “It is possible that the development of novel synthetic agents with more
specific actions and fewer side-effects will extend [synthetic cannabis’s] therapeutic
range” (Ashton 1999: 122). Drug companies could develop more products to treat more
people, capitalizing upon a huge market opportunity.
In some clinical trials, patients preferred Cesamet (nabilone) to other drugs to
treat cancerous pain. It did not depend simply on consumer preference of pharmaceutical
vs. natural cannabis, but their response to their conditions were relatively greater
17

compared to traditional drugs—even in children (di Marzo & de Petrocellis 2006: 557).
This evidence, though not unanimous, suggests that a maker of an effective cannabinoid
could be more competitive than Marinol, Syndros, Cesamet, or other opioids like
Vicodin. Additionally, the FDA has officially recognized that THC can be used to treat
eating disorders like wasting syndrome, and quelling vomiting and nausea during
chemotherapy. Future drugs could treat glaucoma, reverse cancer, treat Multiple
Sclerosis, and dramatically expand the range of symptoms that these drugs treat.
Making these cannabinoids is not a new venture for drug companies. A few drugs
utilize them; Sativex and Marinol are the most well-known. The former is ‘liquefied
marijuana’, and the latter is an FDA-approved, lab-manufactured synthetic. Sativex is in
Phase III clinical trials, the final stage before a market launch. Barring federal prohibition
on marijuana, Sativex is set to be the first cannabis-derived medication in the U.S. GW
pharmaceuticals, a London-based company, patented Sativex. They also make Epidiolex,
a pure liquid CBD, used in the treatment of epilepsy. GW is the leader in marijuanabased medicine, but they have not yet broken into U.S. markets; larger companies like
Pfizer show no signs of taking similar initiatives just yet. However, nearly a decade ago,
five of the world’s top ten drug companies were developing 18 cannabinoid-related
compounds. Plans have since been aborted (ProCon.org 2013).
Sativex treats Multiple Sclerosis. It is not a synthetic, but an oral spray and
derived directly from cannabis. It has been found to be extremely effective, with minimal
adverse effects, even in patients without the disease. Patients in the study even responded
to it better than other, stronger pain medications (di Marzo & de Petrocellis 2006: 559).
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In another study, Sativex was assigned a Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) of 0.15
over 5 years (Lu et al 2012). This serves as an example to show how companies are
improving on the original Marinol product, giving way to new innovations, new
investment opportunities, and competition. One of the reasons that U.S. drug companies
are hesitant to invest in these drugs is because of the international competition from GW.
Currently, Big Pharma is essentially protectionist: it sees marijuana (and cannabis
supplements) as a threat to their profits on opioids. There is a significant risk in
supporting full-scale marijuana legalization and then ‘racing’ to get a cannabinoid to
market. They are cautiously optimistic about cannabinoid drug development, but there is
less risk in seeing how GW’s products fare before divesting from opioids.
Table 1 lists companies who have developed a cannabinoid, successful or not.
Companies Developing Synthetic Cannabinoids

Pharmaceutical Company

Product

Indication(s)

AbbVie

Marinol
(dronabinol)

Quell nausea/vomiting
during chemotherapy;
Reduces neuropathic
pain in Multiple
Sclerosis; HIV/AIDS
appetite stimulant

Valeant Pharmaceuticals Int’l,
Inc.

Cesamet
(nabilone)

Anti-emitic
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Development
Stage
Approved 1985
as an antiemitic,
expanded
indication to
HIV/AIDS
appetite
stimulant 1992,
approved for
MS pain in
Denmark 2003
Approved in
Canada (1982),
sold rights to
U.S. & U.K.
Pharma
Companies

GW Pharmaceuticals

GW Pharmaceuticals

Society for Clinical Research
(Germany)

Sativex
(nabiximols)

Neuropathic and
cancer-related pain,
Alleviates spasticity in
MS

Epidiolex

Alleviate seizures in
pediatric epilepsy and
other rare syndromes

Cannador

Muscle stiffness, MS
spasticity/pain, postoperative pain
management

Dexanabinol

Neuroprotective for
use after cardiac
surgery, memory gain
after traumatic brain
injury, possible use as
anti-cancer drug

Pharmos

Cannabinor

Anti-inflammatory,
treats chronic pain and
neuropathic pain;
bladder control

Sanofi-Aventis

Acomplia
(rimonabant)

Anti-obesity

Solvay Pharmaceuticals
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Approved in 27
countries
outside U.S.,
Phase III
clinical trials
for cancer and
MS pain;
granted FDA
fast-track
development
Early clinical
development,
granted FDA
orphan drug
status
Phase I clinical
trials
Completed
Phase III trials
2004, no
significant
marketing
improvements;
began Phase I
trial for brain
cancer
indication
(2012)
Failed IIa
clinical trials in
2007; Not
approved
outside of
laboratory
research (2012)
Approved in
Europe 2006,
removed from
market; Failed
pre-clinical
trials 2007 in
U.S., not
approved since
2013

Merck

MK-0364
(taranabant)

Anti-obesity

Failed in Phase
III trials; Not
approved since
2013

Cannabis Sciences

CS-S/BCC-1

Oncology

Preclinical trials

Table 1: Adapted from Mintz et al. (2015: 21-22) & ProCon.org (2013)

Suppose researchers discovered an exotic new plant with naturopathic benefits
greater than or equal to marijuana. Drug companies would be highly interested in
developing this in a new drug product, and because it does not have the same (legal or
ethical) history that marijuana does, there would be no restrictions on its import to the
United States, or possession of it in general. Companies could conduct R&D on this new
plant’s biologic properties in Phase I clinical trials. This Phase test the drug on small
groups of human subjects. If there are no serious side effects or if the drug is reasonably
toxic, it would move to Phase II. This Phase still monitors for safety, but the drug is
tested for its effectiveness: is it effective in treating the on-label disease or condition? If it
showed that the drug is not safe and effective or had side effects like severe hallucination
on par with a drug like peyote (mescaline), the drug would not proceed to Phase III,
which ends in marketing.
There are ten drugs listed in Table 1, and more than half of them have failed. Only
40% were approved for marketing: Marinol, Cesamet, Sativex, Epidiolex. At higher
doses, the other 60% showed increased risks of complications, the CBD or THC was not
pure enough, or did not show significant improvement in quality standards to advance to
the next stage of testing. This small sample statistic is not far from the average. Gladin
(2005) notes that 70% of products that are developed are not marketed. “This means that
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the industry has to rely on 30% of products to fully recover out-of-pocket expenses, the
cost of all failures, and the cost of capital (DiMasi, 2001)” (12). The problem that plagues
failed cannabinoid developments seems to be part of a general trend found in the ethical
drug industry as a whole.
The FDA is not opposed to marijuana drug development, expanding research, or
approving botanic-derived drugs in general. The U.S. government even holds a patent on
marijuana. Patent No. 6,630,507 is the U.S. government’s recognition that certain
compounds in cannabis may be useful in treating complications in degenerative brain
diseases like Alzheimer’s or cirrhosis; it is not a claim on the plant itself. Though
contradictory to the DEA’s claim that marijuana has no medical use, the government
allows organizations to use the license as the basis for future research into cannabinoidrelated drugs. The patent does not prove that marijuana has a medical purpose for its
stated use, it provides a base for future research that prove this claim (Wallace 2016; U.S.
6,630,507: 2003).
This highlights the current paradox: marijuana should be legalized, at least
exclusively for research, but the DEA & FDA are not yet convinced that it is safe and
effective to warrant its legalization. Because there has been a ban for so long, the
research that would legitimize it does not exist, so its prohibition remains. In early 2016,
the DEA denied marijuana a rescheduling (again). But it did announce that it would
increase access to the plant for research purposes. Prior to that announcement, it was only
available through the University of Mississippi. I believe that the U.S. is slowly moving
towards legalization, but it will not happen before drug companies can develop and
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market a viable cannabinoid alternative. If this happens (as an economist, I can’t say
much on the scientific possibility, only the economic consequences), Big Pharma will
have an alternative for those who wish to try medical marijuana but do not want to leave
the ethical drug market. Further, these products will be able to compete with international
products like GW’s Sativex and Epidiolex. And yes, cannabinoids would (assumingly)
provide a safer substitute to opioids. The prescription cannabinoid would allow drug
companies to keep the market segmented domestically. The protections on drug
companies until these products are launched segments the market internationally—all
while maintaining customer loyalty.
Drug companies are simply not yet prepared with a competitive, safe, and
effective cannabinoid product. More importantly, the industry is lobbying against
marijuana’s legalization to protect the ‘investment’ that they have made on opioids. It is
no secret that these drugs have created multi-billion dollar profits for Big Pharma; they
see cannabis as a real threat to those profits. It may be that Big Pharma, right now, is only
willing to commit their time, efforts, and investments to one set of products. Would they
prefer to sell opioids, a cash cow; or cannabinoids, a question mark? Legalizing
marijuana right now actually provides a disincentive to make new opioids since it
increases competition and reduces profits. I tacitly argue, however, that increasing the
availability to opioids acts as an incentive to promote innovation and even improve Big
Pharma’s public image. By developing these products, they position themselves ready to
respond to the nationwide opioid epidemic; cannabinoids provide a much safer and
effective alternative.
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However, I think there is a limit to Big Pharma’s intentions. The research on
marijuana has not yet caught up to what drug companies want to do with the product.
They have not yet developed a ‘blockbuster’ product. For example, they have not yet
created a cannabinoid that is at least as effective as opioids in treating chronic pain. As
Big Pharma lobbies against marijuana’s legalization, under the DEA’s guidance to ease
access to the plant, they could presumably—and this is just speculation—simultaneously
do R&D to create a viable cannabinoid. Marijuana would not become fully legalized until
drug companies are able to successfully launch a product that can compete internationally
with GW. So in relation to international market segments, the cannabinoid market is an
infant industry in need of protection from international competition. I do not think that
they will lobby against marijuana forever. There is definitely a profit incentive in
capitalizing in opioids and cannabinoids.
Foundational Studies
We have seen it is not very likely that the FDA would approve phytocannabinoids
(cannabis au naturale) as a prescription drug. There is no legal precedent—much less any
economic incentive—for a company to earn a patent on a specific strain of cannabis.
Nonetheless, while discussing this, Grinspoon (2001) makes an important observation:
[w]ith the present prohibition in place, the economic viability of pharmaceuticalindustry-generated cannabinoid products and the motivation to develop them will
be directly proportional to the vigor with which the marijuana prohibition is
enforced…[M]ost patients who find cannabis useful medicinally choose illegal
marijuana over prescription dronabinol (Marinol) for reasons of efficacy and cost.
One has to ask whether there is any level of enforcement which would compel
enough compliance to embolden drug companies to commit the many millions of
dollars it will take to develop new cannabinoid products (Grinspoon 2001: 382).
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He suggests that there will be two separate market developments when
mentioning the (illegal) cannabis market and the prescription drug market. This is similar
to my realization shown in Figure 1. He, too, questions whether this separation will be
conducive to pushing drug makers into producing marijuana-based drugs if consumers
would strictly prefer the cannabis plant. He mentions elsewhere that while the latter is
usually more efficacious, there are times when it is not desirable and a synthetic drug is
not only more effective, but the circumstances demand it, for example if a patient is
unconscious and s/he requires an intravenous administration (381). This could suggest
that drug makers may find that selling drugs to hospitals may be especially profitable, or
that a prescription should take a form that allows for a rapid onset of the drug’s effects,
like an injection or oral spray.
Drug companies probably will not steal market share from the cannabis market;
those who prefer cannabis are antagonistic towards drug companies. Drug companies
sees a much larger revenue potential in marketing towards those who do not or cannot
smoke: the elderly, those who oppose marijuana, the employed, and ultimately, those
who would only purchase it if paid for by their health insurer. Drug companies will not
operate their own dispensaries selling retail cannabis because that is not their area of
comparative advantage (although it would be advantageous for them to set up marijuana
testing labs and sell equipment). “It is doubtful that pharmaceutical companies would
seem interested in developing cannabinoid products if they have to compete with natural
marijuana on a level playing field” (Grinspoon 2010: 81). Drug companies can raise
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capital and meet quality control standards on a scale that surpasses small-time
dispensaries.
Schneider (2014) picks up where Grinspoon leaves: Schneider discusses the
corporatization of marijuana and the anticipated (positive) effects on states’ tax revenues.
Will ‘big pot’ outpace dispensaries with larger grow operations? He refers to the
emergence of these so-called “pot capitalists.” Schneider posits that in a legal marijuana
market, the cash crop will be distributed, sold, taxed, regulated, and controlled much like
alcohol or tobacco is today. “A profit-focused operation run according to the Big
Marijuana ethos may only be interested in meeting its quarterly sales projections,” rather
than focusing on the health needs of the patient (15). Marijuana is likely to become
commercialized and mass-produced at the expense of cheaper, more inferior quality pot
that does not prioritize the needs of the patient. These businesses, Schneider says, could
outpace dispensaries that grow high-quality plants that cater to patients. He believes that
once marijuana is legal federally, it will be sold only in convenient stores, dispensaries,
or even large box stores much like a Whole Foods or Wal-Mart. He has no intimation that
Big Pharma would use it to produce a synthetic version to market new drugs.
We continue to see that quality seems to be most important determinant in
product choice. Further, in order to appeal to consumers in the botanic cannabis market,
preferences for natural remedies—or a disutility that results from generating revenue for
Big Pharma—may dictate that they will not purchase a cannabinoid, regardless of its
price. When a cannabinoid becomes marketable, patients in the ethical drug market
would be the target market for these products. These patients have been using
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prescriptions for years; in a sense, they are beholden to that market. Patients consuming
cannabis are loyal to their product as well, as are supplement users. Drug companies’
marketing strategy is to target their current customer base, and advertise the higher-grade
cannabis alternative as more appealing than supplements or phytocannabinoids. This will
help establish brand loyalty in future patients.
Royne et al (2014) find that consumers in each market generally tend to be
strongly biased towards either ethical drugs or supplements. More importantly, they
discuss how this applies to each patient’s attitudes toward health awareness:
Given the differences between the product categories, it can be argued that
consumers mindfully and proactively research and adopt supplement products
with the intent of preventing a disease or alleviating symptoms of a condition.
Conversely, prescription drugs are prescribed to consumers after a disease or
condition has been diagnosed by their physician. (Royne et al. 2014: 519).
This supports our assumption that there might exist two separate markets shown
in Figure 1, with two distinct types of patients with unique sets of preferences.
Additionally, consumers’ preferences for supplements is positively associated with
perceived health benefits, so there is a negative association with perceived risks;
consumers tend (erroneously) to perceive supplements as having fewer risks than
prescription drugs (526). Ironically, the majority of consumers of supplements use the
product to treat a condition, finding it to be cheaper—but not necessarily more
effective—than traditional medicines. A large portion of consumers of these products is
uninformed about their actual contents, and is indifferent when told their medical benefits
are dubious (Starr 2015: 478). Royne et al. (2014) found that consumers tend to discredit
these claims altogether. Consumers may see a product advertised as ‘natural’, believing it
27

to be safe. Nevertheless, this claim may be false, the product may contain ingredients not
listed, or it may contain ones that are pharmaceutical-like (Sax 2015: 377). This creates a
moral hazard problem. Companies make billions in profit because the ingredients in their
products (or lack thereof), and the advertising for those, are monitored but not enforced
(Starr 2015: 480-1).
In conclusion, if drug companies cannot create loyal customers from the natural
cannabis market, demand is not likely to shift by much, and prices and revenues would
not increase much further. Therefore, the firm’s objective is not to earn customers from a
new market (cannabis), but to steal market share from other competitors within the
ethical drug market. Cannabinoids may even out-compete opioids; patients will shift
demand from the latter to the former. While patients are still ingesting cannabis, they are
doing it while still purchasing products in the ethical drug market; patients hold to
preferences, increase utility, and Big Parma might retain—maybe even increase—profits.
The current state of the policy literature focuses on states that have already
legalized or decriminalized the plant. These papers often review the ‘aftermath’ of
legalization. These case studies determine how well states are regulating the drug (Hoban
& Patterson 2016; Washington Institute for Public Policy 2013), and offers evidence for a
nationwide marijuana initiative. One of the more recent seminal papers is from Professor
Miron. Miron calculated that a regime that legalizes, controls, and taxes marijuana would
create $10-$14 billion in tax revenue nationwide: $7.7 billion in cost avoidance from
drug enforcement efforts, and $2-$6 billion in tax revenues (2010). Others look at the
costs and benefits of federal legalization (Hellman 1976; Shanahan & Ritter 2014).
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Proponents argue from a legal or ethical standpoint (Martin & Rashidian 2014; Room
2010), or from a public health perspective (Fischer et al. 2015; Barry & Glantz 2016;
Anderson & Rees 2014). Like Schneider (2014), they correctly identify that marijuana
will be sold commercially and dispensaries will face increased competition, perhaps even
from Big Tobacco (Barry et al. 2014). Some authors in the scientific literature recognize
cannabinoids’ value in treating drug and opioid related addictions (Cheer et al. 2015), but
have not looked at the market developments in the ethical drug industry. They suggest
that they hold pharmacoeconomic value, but do not mention that Big Pharma has
economic incentives to develop these drugs, just not yet.

29

Chapter III: Cannabinoid Drug Pricing Strategies
Until now, we have discussed how pharmaceuticals are marketed and sold. There
is much to be said on the topic, especially with regard to pharmaceutical pricing. The
pricing for drugs is based in large part on patent pricing and market exclusivity granted
by the chemical for the new drug. The following literature review allows us to extract
some key pricing structures of the drug industry that will be helpful in the final analysis.
Thus, this it serves as the methodology for the thesis. In the course of reviewing the
pricing strategies that Big Pharma uses, we can make educated predictions about what we
can expect if a drug company were to research, develop, and market a synthetic
cannabinoid drug. Pricing strategies are evaluated in the broader, dynamic context of
innovation and discovery. In this chapter, we will see how marijuana pharmaceuticals
will be priced relative to competitors—both existing and non-existent (i.e. future products
that have yet to be made).
This process depends on patents and market exclusivity, so some of these main
findings are not so surprising. A company making a unique product targeted at a niche
market can charge a higher price relative to other competitors, if they exist. As a general
rule for launch price decisions, we can utilize the following rule:
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ⇒
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𝑢(𝑞)
𝑐(𝑙)

where u(q) is the utility of a drug, based on the QALY it delivers, c(l) is the degree of
competition, based on a firm’s market power (Lerner’s Formula) and l > 0. Basically, a
drug’s specialization, relative to the size of its therapeutic market, determines its price.
Monopolists gain an advantage if they can distance themselves as far apart as possible
from their competition. This creates ‘submarkets’ in which they exert market power
(d’Aspermont et al. 1979). As a reminder, we should think of product differentiation in
the ethical drug market as it relates to the comparability of attributes of various drugs.
Consumer goods must add value to the customer’s life; they must fill a need.
Dean (1969) concluded that monopolies that introduce new “pioneering” products have
two main strategies: skimming and penetration pricing. In the first, the price is set high
because the new product has no close substitutes in the market. As knowledge of the
product dissipates among consumers, the price should tend to fall (Bagwell & Riordan
1991). Over time, the price falls as the firm reaches those with lower reservation prices.
Competing products may take on some attributes of the original pioneering product.
In penetration pricing, drug companies will price new drugs higher in order to
signal that it performs better than any other option currently available on the market. This
is supported by a ‘latitudinal region of price acceptance’ around reference prices. Patients
may be willing to pay slightly more for a product if its higher price is within their frame
of reference, but not exorbitantly above it (Kalyanaram and Little 1994). This ‘reference’
price is formed by comparing similar products and their prices. Over time, patients
become accustomed to paying these slightly higher prices, leading to marginally rising
drug prices. If this is true, this microeconomic reasoning could explain why marginal
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improvements over substitutes induces a slightly higher price that patients will pay. In
penetration pricing, companies may price very low to ‘penetrate’ the market, establish
reputation for itself and its products, and raise the price over time. This theory of
qualitative differentiation between products (and its thrust behind innovation) is a solid
foundation for thinking about modern pricing practices.
In the present analysis, we will deduce a pricing strategy for new synthetic
marijuana pharmaceutical drugs. There are three pricing trajectories for products: i)
prices are set high and fall over time, ii) prices are relatively constant over time, priced at
the market price of current market options (i.e. reference pricing), or iii) prices are set
low and rise over time.
Dean’s discrete high—medium (“parity”)—low scale is helpful, and it can be
more continuous. I will add two more levels: high—medium-high—parity—mediumlow—low. Since we are not dealing with quantitative data, this scale should help us
clarify what we mean when a price is high, but not too high, relative its competitor.
If we uphold the assumption of therapeutic markets, option i) seems the most
likely. New cannabinoids will have a general application, but they are improvements of
older drugs. Over time, as drug patents approach their expiration date or other
competitors are introduced, prices will start to fall to a medium-low or parity reference
price. The same is true for advertising expenses. Physicians will prescribe drugs to their
patients across therapeutic lines regardless of the drug’s indication; the drug’s indication
allows for its patent, not its ability to be prescribed in its intended market. Advertising
and competitive forces will push prices will keep prices steady for a while before being
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pushed down. Thus, prices will initially be set at a medium-high price, falling to a
medium-low or parity price.
In this chapter, I will first describe how the ethical drug market is defined. This
will help establish the market structure in which Big Pharma operates and tell us how its
companies conduct themselves as competing monopolists. Using this setup, I then review
the economic literature regarding pricing strategies as they relate to the ethical drug
industry. I begin with the general and theoretical evidence, and then move to specifics
and empirics. Throughout, my conclusions as they relate to marijuana-based cannabinoid
drugs specifically, are grounded in the literature review. As we will see, most theoretical
conclusions on Big Pharma pricing structures support empirical ones.
Structure-Conduct-Performance
It is widely agreed that drugs are placed into ‘markets’, defined by the therapeutic
benefits that the product delivers. New drugs are produced, marketed, and patented
according to the class of diseases that they are intended to treat. This is called the drug’s
“indication.” There are, at least, 60 different therapeutic markets. Some examples:
Anesthetics

Oncologics

Antibiotics

Opioids

Antihistamines

Psychostimulants

Barbiturates

Sex hormones

Diabetic Therapy

Statins

Diuretics

Thyroid Preparation
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Early studies typically measured a given firm’s market power to answer questions about
the concentration of firms in these markets (Egan et al. 1982: 30-3). What makes
delineating these classes difficult is the fact that one firm can produce various drugs in
various markets and can monopolize on more than one of them. Physicians can—and
often do—prescribe a drug for ‘off-label’ ailments, meaning there will likely be some
overlap among therapeutic markets.
Assuming that patients with a specific illness create a demand for a particular
drug (class), we can say that their demand for a class of illness also defines the
therapeutic market. In other words, when a certain population suffers from a disease,
patients implicitly demand that pharmaceutical companies create a drug to alleviate the
symptoms of that disease (or cure it entirely). On the supply side, drug makers produce
drugs to fill this demand. Physicians have the option to prescribe drugs across therapeutic
markets, regardless of the drug’s final intended use (Tesler et al. 1975: 475). For our
purposes, this provokes discussions on cross-elasticity of demand and market power, with
a focus on firms’ pricing behaviors. Finally, it allows us to see the competition that takes
place within the industry, and its effect on a firm’s pricing decision of a particular drug.
In the analysis in this chapter, we hold to these therapeutic classes. We will see
that defining a therapeutic market as narrowly as possible contributes directly to a drug’s
specialization. This is integral to deciding a drug’s launch price. So we can imagine that
when drug companies produce new cannabinoid drugs, they will be marketed within the
boundaries of these therapeutic markets. However, due to cannabis’s applicability in
treating many symptoms across a range of diseases, we can conclude that in the case of
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oncologics, drug companies will create a drug that targets cancer generally, as opposed to
colon cancer specifically. High prices, therefore, are relegated to specialty and orphan
drugs. These prices (and the markets in which they are found) provide an extreme case.
Market Structure & Competitive Forces
Suppose there is an individual drug company. They have researched and
developed a new drug and are about to bring it to market. Either there are no companies
in this therapeutic market, or no companies have yet successfully developed and marked
their product for sale—they are a pure monopolist. The monopolist innovates new
products (new output) only as competition necessitates it (i.e. as patents expire). After
earning their patent, they have ‘cornered the market’. They hold the legal right to exclude
all competitors from producing the same drug, raising the barriers to entry in the market
enough to exclude other sellers.
In this initial scenario, there is one customer, one patient, and no insurance
through which the patient can purchase the drug; all expenses are out-of-pocket. As
discussed in previous chapters, insurance companies remove (some of) the burden of the
patient’s willingness to pay. Relationships between insurance companies and drug
makers take advantage of this reduced priced sensitivity, and can therefore inflate drug
launch prices. Without them, the monopolist calculates a price according to the methods
described below. Setting aside insurance plans isolates economic forces that result in
drug pricing strategies. In fact, Scherer (2004) says, insurance policies make patients’
price-demand elasticity less sensitive and enhances the drug makers’ ability to price well
above production costs (928).
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Given a novel drug and a pure monopolist position, the monopolist will charge a
high price for the drug, above normal competitive market conditions, where price would
otherwise equal the marginal cost. Levy and Rizansky (2014) show that when the
monopolist drug maker maximizes profit, the optimal price is higher because drug
companies are making a product that delivers substantial health benefits compared to
other drugs (2004: 1-5). The monopolist is a single seller in the market, allowing them to
differentiate prices among different types of customers with varying income levels.
The monopolist’s problem becomes: 𝑚𝑎𝑥 p,x 𝜋 = 𝑝(𝑥) ∙ 𝑥 – 𝑐(𝑥), where
𝑑π

marginal revenue 𝑅′(𝑥) equals marginal cost 𝐶′(𝑥). Maximizing 𝑑𝑥 and solving for 𝑝, we
derive Lerner’s Formula for monopoly power:
𝑝 =(

1
) ∙ 𝐶′(𝑥)
1 + 𝜀𝑝𝑥

Immediately we see that when a monopolist equates 𝑅′(𝑥) to 𝐶′(𝑥), the degree of
the price markup Lerner’s formula depends crucially on the degree of own-price demand
(in)elasticity, 𝜀𝑝𝑥 and marginal cost. It is inversely proportional to the degree of price
markup itself. This implies that for specialty drugs, drugs that have a low demand
elasticity, -0.1 and -0.21 (Goldman et al 2006), prices are likely to be much higher.
Monopolists can exert more market power when the patient has a low price demand
elasticity for drugs that treat a serious disease and are therefore necessary to survival. As
the saying goes, when it comes to patients’ drug treatments, it’s “your money or your
life!” The more effective the drug is in treating serious diseases, the higher the QALYs it
adds to the patient’s life, the lower the price demand elasticity, leading to a higher
markup price. It is not difficult to see what it implies for marijuana-based synthetic drugs.
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Cannabinoid drugs that treat more serious diseases will likely have a lower 𝜀𝑝𝑥 , so 𝑝 will
be higher, and vice versa. Studies have measured 𝜀𝑝𝑥 for cannabis, with a range between
-0.3 and -0.6 (Nichols & Nichols 2013; Pacula & Lundberg 2014). Using this as an
approximate reference, a low price demand elasticity reveals that even for general use
cannabinoid drugs, a monopolist drug maker could afford to charge a high markup price.
How does monopolist theory measure up to the empirical evidence? The
performance of monopolists in the drug industry was validated in what has become
known as the Clemens-Cocks Model. Its main findings were that:
1) A firm in a technological environment can adapt its R&D and manufacturing
processes to develop and produce products in several areas of drug therapy. This
context emphasizes that the behavior of these firms is determined by profitmaximizing decisions that consider several different kinds of drug products.
2) As firms attempt to develop singular new products, they develop, as a byproduct of R&D, products that compete with existing ones. From an empirical
standpoint this can be expected to result in a substantial amount of entry into drug
markets, market shares should be affected, and price pressures should be evident.
3) When an individual firm is successful in developing innovative new products
whose demand curves presumably are favorable relative to costs, resources should
flow to that firm as the profit incentive dictates. This implies that the firm that is
relatively more successful in the stochastic process of finding new drugs should
receive an increased market share and an increased ex post rate of return (Cocks
1975 in Chien 1979: 43).
Pure monopolists in the ethical drug industry is an oversimplification, but it tell us
something about how individual companies price their products in the absence of
substitutes. The Clemens-Cocks model shows us how companies behave in the face of
monopolistic competition. What it doesn’t tell us is that when other companies make
similar (“me-too”) drugs, companies can compete while their products are still on-patent
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(each firm goes through the FDA approval process with a slightly different product).
Even if drugs are differentiable, monopolists may engage in price competition.
In this Bertrand-style competition, “competition between the substitute products
reduces price somewhat below the monopoly price, depending in part on how
substitutable are the two drugs” (Brendt et al. 2011: 9-12). In the latter scenario,
individual firms still make rational profit-maximizing decisions, but the presence of other
monopolists doing the same thing will inevitably lower the launch price. In a variant of
the Bertrand model, the Edgeworth duopoly model shows that for two or more firms with
production constraints, the Nash equilibrium may not exist. Competing monopolists’
profit-maximizing prices oscillate between a minimum where p = C’(x), and a maximum
where C’(x) = R’(x)—the two extremes of Lerner’s Formula. As the degree of
substitution between products decreases, monopolists’ prices become more rigid.
“Uncorrelated” goods do not price-compete with each other (Edgeworth 1925: 119-21).
When authors use a Bertrand duopoly to analyze competition, some assume, as in
the Bertrand and Edgeworth-Bertrand model, that products between firms are perfectly
substitutable homogenous products.
But this framework supposes counterfactually (as Scherer points out), that the
manufacturer is a monopolist. The reality is that nearly all brand name
prescription drugs compete with a therapeutically equivalent brand name drugs or
even chemically indistinguishable generic drugs. A more complete examination of
prescription drug pricing would consider the non-cooperative oligopolistic
interactions among pharmaceutical manufacturers whose drugs are close
substitutes. This can be done using a differentiated-products Bertrand oligopoly
model (Elzinga and Mills 1997: 293-4).
A “differentiated-products Bertrand oligopoly model”, which derives from Edgeworth’s
“uncorrelated” goods case, is essentially a Hotelling model. In this model, studied more
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carefully in the next chapter, the more effective monopolies are in differentiating their
products, the greater the profits that they are able to capture. It essentially relies on a
company’s ability to advertise its ‘uniqueness’ over its competitors.
Firms are able to obtain these profits because rather than cornering the entire
therapeutic market, they advertise to create brand-loyal patients. “[T]he manufacturer
can…concentrate on operation as a monopoly firm in the market of loyal consumers”
(Ismo 2008: 2 citing Frank & Salkever 1992). In this way, firms retain their customers,
effectually making their demand more inelastic. The result is the market power that, a
priori, we should expect a monopolist pharmaceutical firm to wield. Assuming patients
are willing to pay a higher price for a product with fewer side-effects, for example, and
strongly believe that their product of choice stands alone in this regard, this would also
explain why prices for brand-name drugs may increase following patent expiration
(Frank & Salkever 1992 citing Wagner and Duffy 1988; Ramsey 2016). Although an
insurance company’s payment policies are a contributing factor, companies may simply
be targeting a higher-income consumer market.
The price for new drugs must cover the costs of R&D from intense competitive
pressures by the company to patent a marijuana drug for a certain therapeutic market. The
fact that the drug contains synthetic cannabinoids will not be proprietary information.
Drugs like Cesamet, Syndros, and Marinol disclose this information on their packaging,
and Sativex and Epidiolex openly claim their use of cannabis extracts—not synthetics—
to attract patients to their product; companies forego the secrecy in ingredients typically
found in other drugs. This means that companies might lose some of the advantages of
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persuasive marketing that convince customers that their product is more unique than their
competitor’s. As a result, there is a degree of substitution (however slight) of cannabinoid
products across a variety of applications. Companies compete on a price point rather than
on qualitative differences, as an Edgeworth-Bertrand competition model suggests.
Cannabinoid prices will be set relative to the (non)cannabinoid product with which it
competes. Assuming a drug is an improvement over the other, but not so specific as to
warrant a high price, a cannabinoid will generally be given a medium-high launch price.
Rather than a company chemically creating a secret new chemical and thus
claiming intellectual property over it, the use of synthetic cannabis would not be
proprietary information. Marijuana’s medicinal benefits have been known for centuries.
Unlike any other drug, whose ‘recipe’ is confidential, cannabis is public knowledge. Any
drug company could use it. So, the name of a new drug might convey that it contains a
marijuana analog compound. For example, names like Sativex, Cannador, and Marinol
are references to Sativa, Cannabis, and “Mari”juana, respectively. Companies would find
it futile to try to hide this information from the customer.
The response to this is quite simple. It can be imagined that out the outset of
marijuana’s legalization (for scientific research purposes), individual drug companies
begins a ‘race’ to be the first to research and develop a new product, one that improves
over its predecessors—the ‘recipe’ contained in Marinol and Cesamet—and targets a
specific indication or therapeutic market. Only those drugs which make it through the
FDA’s approval process will be granted market approval—the rest will be unsuccessful.
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This is not a “winner take all” race, but a “first past the post” one: the first
company to successfully market an improved marijuana pharmaceutical will not reveal
the new ‘recipe’. The only thing that their competitors will know is that the other has
made some kind of improvement over the existing cannabinoid recipe, without explicitly
stating what that improvement is; they will only learn of the new indication. Drug
companies will patent the synthesis processes of the various compounds, and the new
compounds themselves. So when a future drug maker develops a cannabinoid drug, it
will be patented according to its indication and the process used. Generally, the larger the
number of indications, the lower the market price. Competitive forces, as predicted by the
Clemens-Cocks model and Bertrand oligopolistic competition, should put pressure on
cannabinoid drug prices in the marketplace.
Value- and Performance-Based Pricing Strategies
The price of a new drug depends on a firm’s success in differentiating it from a
competing product. With the substitute acting as a ‘reference price’, it determines how
much a price may deviate from any other possible substitute, with respect to its
therapeutic benefits. For the patient, the reference price establishes a base line for
perceived value or the utility of the next best alternative. Drug makers are able to price
above this if the net benefits of their product is positive—and below if the additional
perceived value is negative (Gregson et al 2005). Firms remain price makers, but they
account for improvements over their competitor’s product. For example, prices for
current cannabinoid market options like Marinol and Cesamet will serve as reference
prices for new cannabinoid products. To the patient’s knowledge, these are the closest
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substitutes in the ethical drug market without consuming botanic cannabis. Product
characteristics can be reflected in fewer side effects, higher potency, longer-lasting
therapeutic effects, and different modes of administration (e.g. a pill vs. an oral spray).
This gives them a competitive advantage over possible substitutes. Marinol and Cesamet
are more potent than cannabis since they offer high THC (psychoactive component) and
low CBD (physical healing component) content.
Modern-day drug pricing strategy relies heavily on value-based pricing. In a
recent study, the authors used trial data, conditional on its expected benefit added to the
patient, the patient’s willingness to pay (set at some threshold, which is the only
constraint on the optimal price in each stage of development trials). They assigned valuebased price was zero if the trial result was not statistically significant, and otherwise
adjusted based on added cost-effectiveness. From there, the authors forecasted profit rates
using a Bayesian probability analysis and determined a market price (Breeze & Brennan
2015). A statistically insignificant price is zero for the same reason that a drug company
will drop a product from the development pipeline if it fails to show effectiveness. As
trials progress, if the product does not show promising signs, or if it is not a significant
improvement over the company’s competitors, development will be aborted. A price of
zero (in this study) translates into a product is not adding value to the customer. This
approach is a distant relative to the classic study of ‘theory of the firm’. At each stage of
development, a new product should be priced such that the marginal benefit equals the
marginal cost of adding the input.
The most profitable way to attract customers from rivals is not necessarily only to
lower price; product improvement and innovation will also contribute to
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profitability, and at the margin, the ratio of the benefit added to profit by lower
price to the benefit from further innovation should be equated to the ratio of their
respective marginal costs (Egan et al 1982: 47-8 citing Brozen 1975).
In other words, the input price should equal its marginal benefit to the final product.
Breeze and Brennan’s value-based pricing and the classical theory of the firm
come together to inspire Dimitiri’s (2014) work. Her paper essentially says that in each
stage of the development period, the market price for the drug will equal the expected
profits at that stage; as the drug moves closer to marketing, the probability that it will be
successful increases, as does the market price. Dimitri considers the development in a
network of research firms. Either a drug company could develop the product itself “inhouse”, or it can buy the rights from another firm. This takes on an important distinction
if the drug fails in a phase of testing. The company does not drop the product from its
line, but instead:
[these price and profit] considerations provide a benchmark for the market price.
If the selling company cannot afford development up to registration [of the new
drug] (e.g. it is a small firm), a larger buying firm could exploit its ‘buyer power’
by negotiating a lower transaction price (217).
Dimitri concludes with something obvious: the price of the drug equals its expected
payoff to the firm. Big Pharma will purchase future cannabinoid recipes—failed or not—
from smaller, less capital-intensive drug companies, as the Clemens-Cocks model
suggests. Larger companies like Merck & Co. will have better probabilities at successful
development simply due to their larger capacity to conduct R&D successfully. The price
at which the rights are purchased from small firms, based on their proven effectiveness,
sets a benchmark for the launch price. The QALYs added to the patient sets a premium
on this benchmark, an upper limit.
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The practice of putting a drug into a price range, rather than a unique discrete
price as in Dimitri, is known as performance-based pricing. When a drug meets certain
“milestones” or “endpoints” in terms of efficacy (value-based), rather than progressing
into the next development stage regardless of efficacy (performance-based), a price could
be negotiated (Dranitsaris et al 2015). The proposed policy in Dranitsaris is based on
some well-known practices that are widely used in the U.K. Specifically, a drug’s price is
based on the Quality of Life Adjusted Years (QALY)—the longevity a medical procedure
can add to a person’s life.
Evidence shows that drugs that treat acute conditions have a higher price than
those that treat chronic conditions (Taubman & Mason 1989 in Kolassa 1997: 55-56);
Brendt et al. (2011) confirm that this is found in the case of specialty drugs: drugs that
treat a very specific—maybe even rare—condition. For this class of drugs there are often
no close substitutes, so both buyers and sellers know the high price is justified. This is
emphasized as a point of exaggeration: this is not the case for cannabinoids. Rather, this
contrast helps us understand how new cannabinoid products that treat a broad range of
symptoms will opt for a lower price than a drug that treats a specific illness like a specific
type of cancer, Multiple Sclerosis, or seizures. It is unlikely that cannabinoids will be
specialty, orphan drugs (Epidiolex is the exception, since it is the first of its kind on the
market). A drug that treats general symptoms instead of a specific disease has many more
competitors. The more intense the competition, the lower the price.
Zaric (2008) formally modeled this. He uses a Markov probability distribution of
a disease progression, in which death is the final stage. This distribution models how a
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manufacturer will set its drug price based on: a patient’s willingness-to-pay, cost
effectiveness of the drug, and the aggressiveness of the disease’s progression.
There is a relationship between population heterogeneity and the optimal
proportion of the population that is targeted. For a relatively homogenous
population (not much variation in [the progression of the disease between patients
in the population]) it is optimal to set a high price and target a relatively
restrictive subset of the population, whereas for a relatively heterogeneous
population it is optimal to set a lower price and get a greater proportion of the
population. Thus, it is important for manufacturers to understand the entire
distribution…when setting prices… (1287).
(It should be noted that in Zaric’s study that cost effectiveness has a greater influence on
insurer’s reimbursement decision of a patient’s drug.) When the drug is a one-of-a-kind,
and the disease is equally as threatening, the drug company is able to exert a significant
amount of market power to get the patient to pay the asking price.
A higher cross-price elasticity of demand will naturally lend itself to lower drug
prices. Chen and Rizzo (2010) develop a conceptual framework to find that in the market
for antidepressant drugs, which, they say, is known to be a market with many close
substitutes. “[I]n markets where products are relatively well-differentiated, higher quality
entrants will tend to adopt a market skimming pricing strategy. In more homogenous
markets, we expect…a market penetration pricing strategy” (297). This may also occur if
consumers are uncertain of the new drug. Companies may trade short-term profit losses
“to familiarize consumers with the product, reaping the benefits of higher market shares
and prices over time” (Chen 2008: 9-10; Schmalensee 1982). In rare cases, companies
will maintain a low price to deter other companies from competing. Once they’ve
cornered the market, they will raise it (Chien 1979: 85).
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As the market for which a given cannabinoid drug can be prescribed is enlarged, a
skimming pricing strategy becomes more likely. Essentially, U.S. drug makers will
launch the drug at a medium-high price to compete for market share sought after by
outside drug companies like GW Pharmaceutical’s Sativex or Epidiolex. Eventually, these
prices will fall to parity with close (non)cannabinoid substitute drugs with similar
treatments and side effects. Even though enlarging the market should reduce prices, drug
companies will be able to offer a higher price. Cannabinoids will deliver, assumingly, a
better quality of life compared to the product with which it is competing. If this were not
the case, they would be offered one ‘level’ below at a parity reference price. Also recall
from Chapter II that the quality, accessibility, and convenience of this product affords it
an additional premium above the reference price.
Given the availability to information about synthetic cannabinoids and their
utility, companies will not likely try to persuade customers in their advertising that one
drug treats only one condition. Sativex and Epidiolex are formally indicated to treat
Multiple Sclerosis and epilepsy, respectively, but their oral spray delivery method makes
it quite likely that patients will soon have it prescribed to them for a whole range of
therapeutic reasons. Sativex and Epidiolex will likely be prescribed across therapeutic
markets, increasing the cross-price elasticity of demand. The same may be true of to-be
other synthetic cannabinoid drugs.
Regarding general use drugs, how will companies price their rebranded products
that are now off-patent and competing with cheaper generics? Consider, for example,
OxyContin (oxycodone HCL). An improved version would be OxyContin + CBD. This
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would be repackaged and sold as an ‘improved’ brand-name OxyContin. It would be
priced higher than traditional OxyContin and other competitors like Vicodin
(hydrocodone and acetaminophen). When synthetic cannabinoid products are rebranded,
we should expect that their prices will start a medium-high after rebranding. They will
follow a similar trajectory as described above.
In any case, the decline in prices will be the result of a couple things. First, since
cannabinoid drugs can be prescribed across therapeutic markets, there is more room for
competition. Competition will necessitate more intense advertising—promotional costs
which will keep prices pegged to drug prices. According to Chen & Rizzo’s (2010)
conclusions, it is likely that prices will remain low. Both the increase in advertising and
the increase in value added to the patient’s life will offset any pressures on prices. In the
special case where a synthetic marijuana drug treats a specialty market or serious disease
where all other products have failed, the drug could actually warrant a further increase in
price. This should be considered the exception, though, not the rule.
Pricing in Practice: Empirical Work
Most of the conclusions about how the industry prices its products were found in
the early years of the pharmacoeconomic discipline. The most relevant papers often cited
from the literature are between the 1960s and 1980s. Reekie (1978) was the first to
examine price trends for new drugs, extending Dean’s concepts of skimming and
penetration pricing to pharmaceuticals. He found that new pharmaceutical drugs that
present pioneering advancements are priced higher than any close substitutes on the
market, while imitators are priced much lower.
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Like Dean, (1969), most authors in the literature use ordinal terms to describe
pricing and profits. “High” and “low” have no apparent numeric value. Reekie (1978)
addressed this by referring to prices on a discrete range of low-medium-high price by
calculating ratios of the average price of the new product relative to the weighted average
price of leading competitive drugs. “Low” prices had a ratio of less than 1.0, “medium”
prices, 1.0-1.5, “high” prices, above 1.5.
As patents approach expiration, companies begin to lower prices to anticipate the
entry of generic drugs. “While monopoly positions are conferred, patent protection does
not normally confer the power to monopolize any of the therapeutic markets. This is
borne out by the high turnover among leading firms and the vigorous product competition
within these markets” (Comanor in Chien 1979: 39). In a follow-up study to the
Clemens-Cocks theoretical model, high market concentration ratios were found alongside
high market entry rates: “Successful new drugs appear and seize a commanding position
only to falter after five or more years and are replaced by, presumably, better rivals”
(Tesler et al. 1975: 460). This model predicts that drug companies making synthetic
cannabinoids will monopolize in multiple therapeutic markets, these drugs will compete
with existing options, and that firms will be profitable.
The oft-cited Lu & Comanor (1998) study supported Reekie’s findings. They
found that pioneering products were priced about 3.2 times any close substitute; new
drugs offering smaller, modest gains were introduced with prices 2.17 times substitutes,
and those offering little-to-no gain were priced relatively equivalent to substitutes.
Although this study is relatively newer, it analyzed new drugs developed between 1978
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and 1987. They also looked at these drugs’ prices over time, at 4, 6, and 8 year intervals.
All prices, essentially, are set based on a qualitative (“therapeutic”) improvement over
competitors. Thus, at each stage of pre-market and pre-clinical trials, drug companies are
reviewing the launch price based on the product’s marginal benefit. As monopolists, drug
companies are at liberty to set any price for their products, insofar as it reflects a (lack of)
similarity in available substitutes and an increase medicinal value.
The dynamic among competing, price-making monopolies is unique to the drug
industry. But it should be noted that this value-based approach only sets an upper limit
price for a pricing range. This determines what the market will bear. The company’s
perspective sets a lower limit for a price range, determined by a minimum return on
investment needed to satisfy shareholders (Gregson et al 2005). The evidence makes it
apparent that future synthetic marijuana drugs will be priced similarly. Ones that are less
addictive than opioids or otherwise offer fewer adverse side effects will afford a higher
price. Cannabinoids that are marginally better than competing products will use those
products as a reference price.
The rise in prices is largely dependent on the types of patients the drugs target
rather than the competition among those drugs which, as we have seen in general use
drugs, should be pressured downward (if they are new innovations at the time of market
introduction). Further, since demand price elasticity for these drugs is very inelastic
(Goldman et al 2006), drug makers with great market power can exploit patient’s need
for the drug, measured by a higher willingness-to-pay. Drug makers factor this low price
demand elasticity into their Lerner’s markup price. This shows that the conclusions from
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theoretical papers support empirical ones. This would also explain why the prices of
specialty oncology drugs have been rising despite small therapeutic gains in new drugs
(Howard et al 2015). Manufacturers can still produce drugs that are not associated with
large QALY gains, yet they may still fetch a much higher prices since they serve a
specialty market. Even if new drugs are small improvements above others, high drug
prices are a result of marketing in a therapeutic market where patients have a high
willingness-to-pay for potentially life-saving treatments. The new advancement in
technology will provide a push for more efficient drugs. Investors will set a lower limit
on the price range for cannabinoids. Patients’ willingness-to-pay will set the upper limit.
Without identifying a clear independent variable, the effect of patent expiry on
price change is ambiguous: prices (and quantities) can rise or fall for drug prices; there is
evidence to support both trends. This significant variable, Lakdawalla & Philipson (2012)
say, is advertising. It is reflective of drug’s launch price and the trajectory that it will
follow. When there are multiple firms competing for market share and advertising their
own products to patients (and physicians), it offers better insight to pricing strategies. The
largest costs tend to be in advertising, which can be as much as twice the expenditures on
R&D (Gagnon and Lexchin 2008 in O’Connor 2014: 573). Rising drug prices have to
recoup rising developmental and promotional costs.
Recall that Lerner’s Formula shows how demand elasticity rises with a restriction
in quantity. But this inefficiency can be lessened when the elasticity of demand with
respect to advertising is higher. By contrast, patent expirations may reduce output if
companies reduce advertising efforts by enough to offset the impact of price reductions.
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The estimated demand function implies that in the short run (first 5 months),
output decreases after patent expiration because the reduction in advertising more
than offsets the reduction in price…not until several years has elapsed does the
price effect dominate the reduction in advertising (2012: 153-5, 158).
What that means empirically, Lakdwalla & Philipson find, is that when drug patents
expire, ones that remain fully advertised see a price increase and quantity decrease.
Likewise, for drugs with little-to-no advertising, prices behave as we would expect
according to the standard monopoly theory: prices decrease and quantities increase (168).
Given the influx of a variety of cannabinoid products, the direct-to-consumer advertising
for these drugs will largely increase in the patent’s earlier years. Generally, prices will be
set at a relatively high price before falling after patents expire and generics become
available. If the product has a more narrow specialization, some companies may increase
prices to capitalize on patients’ brand loyalty.
At this point, we can see how firms’ pricing strategies, when tied to advertising,
can explain the problem of rising drug prices across the industry. Though a pressing
issue, rising price trends is not the focus here. Our investigation of individual firm’s
pricing strategies is complete. A drug’s launch price is a function of: patients’
willingness-to-pay as income dictates, advertising and promotional costs, patient’s crossprice demand elasticities for substitutes, and value-based competition among competitors.
We have also not considered generic entry into the market. Suffice to say, generic
cannabinoid medicines will contribute to falling cannabinoid prices.
Throughout this literature, we have arrived at some important conclusions:
1.

Specialization vs. General Use: New drugs are priced relative to
competitors. New drugs offering significant benefits over competitors
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will be priced higher, but this price is likely to decline over time. The
opposite is true of a drug offers marginal or no benefits over other market
options. A drug with a very specific indication is priced much higher than
a drug that can be prescribed across a range of therapeutic markets.
2.

Skimming vs. Penetration Pricing: If the patient is uncertain of the drug’s
effects, drug makers will ‘penetrate’ the market with an initial low price
offering. If the drug is widely anticipated, the opposite is true, and drug
makers will ‘skim’ patients with higher levels of willingness-to-pay for
better health, lowering the price over time.

3.

High Market Concentration Ratios: This leads us to believe that products
are priced according to traditional monopolist theory, where marginal cost
equals marginal revenue, and the resulting mark-up over marginal cost
depends on the elasticity of demand (Lerner’s Formula). Firms may also
price discriminate among patients’ levels of willingness-to-pay.

4.

Promotional Costs: Price is not the only consideration for a patient’s
decision to try a new drug. Drug makers gain monopoly and pricing power
by creating brand-loyal patients. After patent expiration on name-brands,
generics enter the market. Drug makers raise their prices and some
patients will continue to purchase the former because of higher income
levels or marketers persuade patients that name-brand drugs are of
superior quality. In this way, the market is segmented through intense
advertising and promotion. Therefore, we should expect some competition
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in the drug market to result in a Bertrand-style non-price competition. A
large contributing factor to price trends includes promotional intensity.
The output decision in a cannabinoid’s pricing requires many inputs, including:


Cross-market & off-label prescriptions



Introduction of generic cannabinoid products & international competition



Improved quality, access, and convenience of cannabinoids over cannabis



Expected profits determined by the price at which large drug companies
purchase intellectual property rights to develop their failed products



Improved quality of cannabinoids over opioids and other ethical drugs
usually associated with addiction and negative side effects



Drug companies’ (in)ability to drive brand loyalty

Many other factors are lost in this discussion. We have not considered: regional
price differences, income between patients affecting rebates, reimbursements, and
discounts; and we have neglected insurance companies and reference prices as they relate
to rate setting. This discussion also neglects direct wholesale prices and other measures of
pharmaceutical pricing. Perhaps a future quantitative study could measure the effect of
these variables on price. Nevertheless, this study serves as a base model for synthetic
marijuana pricing strategies. The literature suggests that these prices will be somewhat
high but fall over time. Nothing below a reference price would justify the time, costs, and
effort required to bring a new drug to market. If a cannabinoid price were below parity, a
drug company would abort its product launch.
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Chapter IV: Marketing & Pricing for Cannabis Supplements
As drug companies deepen their knowledge about cannabinoids and marijuana in
general, researchers may uncover new compounds. Unlike single molecule compounds in
drugs, these herbal supplements would contain a profile of synthetic THC, CBD, and
minor compounds that more closely resemble the cannabis plant.
It is postulated that the beneficial therapeutic effects of cannabis result from the
interaction of different cannabinoids and other compounds present in Cannabis
sativa L. This may explain why cannabis-based medicines made from whole plant
extracts may be more effective than single cannabinoid products [like Marinol or
Syndros] (Stott 2004: 85).
In this chapter, we review the other half of the market, OTC herbal supplements
sold in retail stores vs. cannabis sold in marijuana dispensaries, shown in Figure 1. We
explore the marketing options for each, with special attention given to herbal
supplements. We then apply these conclusions to rationalize pricing decisions.
These product prices are based on the production costs it takes to bring them to
market. Contrast this with pharmaceuticals, whose prices are largely based on market
exclusivity. Pricing of herbal supplements depends on consumer demand and a traditional
cost-plus pricing method: they are priced at marginal cost plus a rate of profit premium,
derived from rents on advertising and some degree of substitution (which would be zero
if the goods were perceived as homogenous). Prices will probably be lower for
supplements than cannabis, and even lower than pharmaceuticals to reflect a lower grade
of quality. Herbal supplements will adopt a medium-low to low price skimming strategy.
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As we will see, a lack of quality control and patent pricing, targeting lower-income
consumers, increased advertising, and a broader range of therapeutic applications are all
factors that will determine this outcome. Note that supplements do not add value to the
launch price in the same way that a prescription drug does. This applies to non-price
competing products. In the marijuana market, presumably the price competition
determines the final price. In other words, since price is indicative of product quality,
product differentiation with respect to quality is the lens through which we examine
consumers’ product choices.
Cannabis as an Herbal Supplement
The interaction between dispensaries and nutrition stores provides a unique
opportunity to use Hotelling’s linear model. It provides rich insight into marketing and
pricing structures. Companies compete for customers within their own strata, whether it
be physical distance, product quality, or customers’ income levels (de Frutos et al. 2013).
Regarding the latter, companies typically market OTC supplements to those with
a lower level of willingness-to-pay for health (McCann in Sax 2015: 378). In support of
this, evidence shows that the demand for supplements increased during the Great
Recession (Gross 2009), when income levels were greatly reduced. Any potential
customer using cheaper herbal supplements will be a price-sensitive, moderate-to-light
user who does not feel a sense of loyalty to purchase from dispensaries. These customers
may find that OTC herbal supplements are more cost-effective for them; they value
marijuana’s benefits but cannot afford botanic cannabis. Supplements therefore capitalize
on a consumer segment with a lower willingness-to-pay and consequently has limited
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access to health information on these products. This neatly summarizes monopolists’
ability to discriminate prices among consumer markets.
Market Structure & Competitive Forces
Let us first review the basic Hotelling model depicted below in Figure 2. Suppose
that there are two stores selling the same good. Consumers are equally spaced between
two companies, and the midway point is exactly halfway between both stores. Customers
seek to maximize their utility, and minimize transportation costs of travelling to the store.
It stands to reason that customers will patron the store nearest to them. If either store
decides to relocate closer to the midway point, they will be closer to a greater number of
customers and thus gain a larger market share. Each store have an incentive to do this, so
in this game’s Nash equilibrium, both stores settle at the midway point; each store earns
50% of the market share (Hotelling 1929; Roy 2000). In the Edgeworth-Bertrand version
of the Hotelling model, the firm that lowers its price will capture a greater market share,
but prices will oscillate between a monopolist’s price p, determined by Lerner’s Formula,
and p’ (Edgeworth 1925: 119-21) as in the competitive case where p = marginal cost.

Figure 2

We can readily apply this to the marijuana market. Consider two stores: a
marijuana dispensary selling cannabis, and a retail shop selling dietary and herbal
supplements. On the west side of town, the dispensary serves the cannabis-preferring
clientele. On the east side of town, the nutrition store caters to those who prefer health
supplements. Customers living on the west side of town receive no utility from cannabis.
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They enjoy a positive level of utility from the health supplements purchased on the other
side of town—despite the transportation cost that it imposes. In other words, it is still
worthwhile to buy the good since the benefit outweighs its cost. The same is true for the
cannabis-preferring clientele on the east side of town. In a one time period model, it is
assumed that each company has not yet built a new store on the opposite side of town. If
they did, Hotelling’s Law tells us that they will be in close proximity to each other.
Realistically, if the two stores relocated closer to each other, each would earn a greater
market share, but sell their products at lower prices.
Think of the ‘distance’ between stores as a metaphor for product choice within a
product space. Customers choose the product that most closely fits their exogenously
given preferences. In the market explored in this chapter, there are customers who prefer
supplements and those who prefer botanic cannabis. Both products advertise similar
therapeutic benefits; however, loyal cannabis customers may find that herbal supplements
are therapeutically inferior. Likewise, herbal supplement users may find that cannabis is
therapeutically superior, but nonetheless unaffordable. Heavy cannabis smokers are likely
to remain loyal to their local dispensary. If they need oils or supplements, they obtain
them at the dispensary or at home—not the nutrition store. These users prefer the
experience, culture, and effectiveness of smoked cannabis and are willing to pay more for
it. They will not get the same utility from simply ingesting a pill! Cannabis supplements
therefore serve as a lower-grade option for customers with reduced income levels. In the
general sense, these products are not acquired tastes; ‘learning’ an appreciation for the
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other product creates a ‘transportation cost’ of moving toward that good within the
product space.
Hotelling’s Law tells us that firms who can ‘move towards each other’ in terms of
product differentiation, will do so. Firms who cannot differentiate themselves will see a
loss in market share to their competitor. Given some degree of cross-price demand
elasticity, cannabis and herbal supplement users are likely to see the quality between the
two with some degree of substitution. (At this point, this degree is indeterminate, but it
may be small and positive).
Supplement makers must effectively advertise to cannabis users in order to
increase this degree of substitution, though it seems unlikely that they will be successful.
We may conclude that supplements will diverge from cannabis in the product space in
terms of quality. It does this by advertising that supplements have all the same
characteristics of cannabis, but at a cheaper price. This way, they make supplements out
to be as similar to botanic cannabis as possible. However, there is actually large
difference in quality: supplements are less effective, have lower standards of quality
control, and are less potent. Strangely, the two products will diverge in terms of quality,
but slightly converge in terms of product differentiation. Since the former effect largely
overpowers the latter, cannabis will face less competition from supplements—but this
will probably be counteracted by the increase in competition against other dispensaries; it
will continue to cater to heavy smokers who are loyal to the cannabis submarket.
This kind of product competition results from market structures for dietary
supplements that are far less regulated than that of pharmaceuticals. It would be no
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different than comparing competing food products—because supplements are considered
foods. There is less rigor in terms of development, regulation, and marketing. In fact, the
claims made on the bottles are often not scientifically proven, and the FDA does not
strictly regulate them. Unlike pharmaceuticals, dietary supplements are not required to
prove that they are safe and effective for human consumption before they are sold. Only
when a supplement claims to treat, diagnose, or cure a disease does the FDA require that
a supplement be approved as a drug. This laissez-faire policy on supplements is a
construct of the current legislation, the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act
(DSHEA) of 1994. “The regulation created an incentive for marketers to make relatively
nonspecific structure-function claims rather than more explicit health claims because
structure-function claims did not require documentation of safety or proof of efficacy”
(Mason & Scammon 2011: 202).
As noted earlier, a large portion of consumers of these products is uninformed
about their actual contents, and is indifferent when told their medical benefits are dubious
(Starr 2015: 478). Royne et al. (2014) found that consumers tend to discredit these claims
altogether. Consumers may see a product advertised as ‘natural’, believing it to be safe.
Nevertheless, this claim may be false, the product may contain ingredients not listed, or it
may contain ones that are pharmaceutical-like (Sax 2015: 377). This creates a moral
hazard problem. Companies make billions in profit because the ingredients in their
products (or lack thereof), and the advertising for those products, are monitored (by the
FCC, not the FDA) but not enforced (Starr 2015: 480-1). Moreover, they will come in
different strengths to mimic the effects of different cannabis strains.
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Marijuana Supplement Marketing
What does all of this imply for marketing cannabis oil supplements? Foremost,
the makers of these products would not need to show that they are safe and effective.
Even though the information on the medical benefits of marijuana are vast and easily
accessible, consumers may be disinclined to research them. If they are likely to buy these
products en masse, producers need not invest the multi-millions of dollars required of the
drug industry to prove product safety. Sans patent pricing, this allows supplement makers
to price much lower than pharmaceuticals. Implicitly, consumers could use supplements
for ‘off-label’ health problems. Supplement makers could advertise this superficial lowcost treatment option for wide-ranging ailments.
There is no assurance that one brand’s version of cannabis oil will be comparable
to the next. Different brands could claim that their product comes from a unique strain of
cannabis known to treat a certain ailment, but there may not be an accurate listing of
ingredients or dosage amounts. This results in products that may have dubious and
biological effects in treating a specific condition—and supplement makers need not
advertise otherwise. In fact, the risk falls on the consumer for using the product, who is
generally uninformed on the ingredients in supplements or erroneously believes that the
FDA regulates them. Producers will likely use pharmaceutical-like cannabinoid analogs.
The description on the bottle will describe how their product can help alleviate certain
conditions, but they will not claim that it can treat, diagnose, or cure them.
Again, since price is indicative of quality, and quality is sub-par, prices for
generic herbal supplements could be below parity with cannabis, slightly inflated by
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advertising costs. Customers who want a higher quality product must be willing to pay
the higher price. This medium-low price falls over time as advertising costs decrease;
recall that Lakdawalla & Pilipson (2012) found that declining market prices are pegged to
advertising costs. Prices decline as the originality of the product dissipates, and patients
‘learn’ that its quality is inferior to botanic cannabis. It is not likely that prices for
cannabis will increase much further. If marijuana were legalized and more
“ganjapreneurs” entered the market, profits and prices would be competed away.
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Chapter V: Are Cannabinoids the New Opioids?
In the late 20th century, the introduction of birth control caused a great shift in the
drug industry. In the early 21st century, it was opioids. Cannabinoids could prove to be
the third great shift. Eventually, marijuana will be federally legalized, taxed, and
regulated. Drug companies will have full access to the plant to develop products that will
replicate its effects. Although its stigma continues for many who still use marijuana, it is
slowly fading; marijuana will emerge into the state-of-the-art medical practice. With the
expansion of a revolutionary new class of drugs, could their novelty—and substitution
effect on other drugs—reduce prices and demand for competing pharmaceuticals,
including opioids? This is an intriguing speculation worthy of further research.
This paper has been a useful exposé of the core of the drug industry’s pricing
strategies. It helps us understand the strategic process that goes into determining a drug’s
price, which many deem as overtly exploitative. Most drugs rely heavily on a price that
correlates to the advances in medical treatment it has begotten. Often times, the increase
in price justifies cost savings elsewhere in the health system, e.g. hospital visits. Our
results tell us nothing new in terms of how the pricing strategies will change after
cannabis’s legalization.
Summary of Findings
This work has been an attempt to bridge the gap in the literatures between the
pharmacoeconomic field and the mainstreaming of marijuana. There is evidence that
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companies are currently creating these drugs, yet their economic effects in the drug
industry, especially cannabinoids’ pricing and marketing strategies, has been largely
unaddressed. Overall, I concluded that if new cannabinoid drugs are brought to market,
prices would be somewhat high. Some drugs will offer a great contribution to the medical
practice. If successful, they could treat conditions associated with: cancer, Multiple
Sclerosis, rheumatoid arthritis, chronic depression, heart disease, seizures, and more. It is
likely, however, that cannabinoids would have a more general application. They would
be new and improved rebrands of older drugs, treating less serious conditions like minor
headaches. The cannabinoid agent would likely allow these drugs to be used across a
range of therapeutic markets because they are designed to treat symptoms of an illness,
rather than a specific disease itself. Therefore, “high” priced drugs would be specialty
drugs, so cannabinoids should be at least one tier below. The lag time between a drug’s
launch into a therapeutic market and patients ‘learning’ of its off-label applications would
correlate with greater competition and a decline in price.
Similarly, the introduction of generic health supplements could be added to diet
and exercise regimens, pre-natal care, and more. However, I concluded that cannabis
health supplements would likely be made cheaply, advertised effectively (albeit still
dubiously), and may actually compete prices down in the botanic cannabis submarket.
This result is a function of a Hotelling product space model. Although cannabis and
supplements are not perfect substitutes, the (assumingly small and positive) degree of
substitutability provides price competition nonetheless.
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A New Way Forward
This work began with a hypothetical: what would happen if marijuana were
legalized? It also began with a series of assumptions, most of which are realistic. Of these
assumptions, we assumed that the ethical drug markets and the marijuana markets were
separate, that there was very little product competition between these markets’ respective
products. Admittedly, this assumption may not be sustainable. However, in this work it
allowed us to analyze the pricing decisions of each product individually. For example, we
can look at the pricing decisions in a segmented market for prescription drugs without the
influence of competing products like supplements or naturopathic medicine.
Although removing this assumption will very likely change our results, I would
like to reiterate that this work provides a foundation for future studies. Moving forward,
future research should examine how these products interact and perhaps complement
each other. What could be the resulting price in that case? This would increase
competition, more importantly, what marketing strategies might firms devise to reduce
any arbitrage?
Furthermore, we also assumed that the market price ‘signals’ to the customer the
quality of the marijuana product that they are buying. This might be a reasonable
assumption, but it ignores the fact that prescription drugs (and health care in general) is
an experience good. The patient cannot ascertain the quality of care they are about to
receive until they have already consumed the product. Patients may self-select themselves
into a market, but may not ‘get it right’ the first time. They might experiment with
various cannabinoid products before settling on the most effective one for their needs.
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The reality is that patients are increasingly disillusioned with the drug industry.
They are substituting pharmaceuticals with marijuana, and drug companies cannot
continue to resist legalization, or they will continue to leak profits. Further, opiates are
coming under more intense scrutiny. They have proven to be highly addictive, and are a
leading cause of accidental deaths across the country. As the epidemic grows more dire,
drug companies have an incentive to look into developing cannabinoids. By doing so,
they should take on more corporate social responsibility—lest they come under more
scrutiny for not taking action, despite being well positioned to do so. Over time,
increased sales from cannabinoids may even replace opioids. If marijuana were legalized
before drug companies have a viable product, they could lose domestic and international
sales. This scenario becomes increasingly probable when considering that nearly 30 states
have some form of a medical marijuana program. A shifting power balance to state
legalization could act as a catalyst for Big Pharma’s increased cannabis research efforts.
Drug companies lobby heavily against marijuana legalization despite definite economic
benefits in their favor. Once the prohibition is removed and patients can self-select
themselves either into the cannabis market or the insurer-approved ethical drug market,
drug companies do not need to worry about losing additional revenue. Therefore, this
study supports policy efforts to move towards marijuana legalization for scientific
research and possible prescription drug development.
If drug companies could successfully market new synthetic cannabinoids, insurers
may be interested in covering them in future drug plans. Insurance companies have
significantly more market power to bargain with drug companies. The former can
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negotiate at which price they will pay for the drug, and this price will likely be lower than
the initial market launch price determined in this study. The entry of generic
cannabinoids, especially, will result in much lower cannabinoid drug prices. Cannabis
must take this route if it is to find its way into the formal health care system.
It is my hope that this study, in one way or another, has added new knowledge
and understanding to the conversation on marijuana legalization. Understanding how Big
Pharma operates, and including drug companies in the anti-prohibition debate, may bring
a hypothetical legalization to a reality. They are an important stakeholder in the
conversation so they must be brought to the table. Moreover, I hope that this study is a
step forward in putting the “ethical” back into the ethical drug industry.
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